讲座时间：10月14日上午10:30
讲座地点：九里校区零号楼0411室
讲座题目：Share Pledge and Corporate Debt Financing
讲座摘要：This study details an investigation of the relationship between controlling shareholders’ share pledge and (a) firms’ financial leverage and (b) the cost of debt. Consistent with the literature suggesting that firms with controlling shareholders pledging their shares are associated with greater information asymmetry, we find that controlling shareholders’ pledging activity is positively related to a firm’s total debt ratio and cost of debt. Further analyses show that better corporate governance and more firm transparency can alleviate these agency costs. Finally, we find implicit government guarantees may play an important role in reducing these agency costs, as state-owned enterprises’ cost of debt is less affected by controlling shareholders’ share pledge. Overall, this study provides support for the pecking order theory and proposes that controlling shareholders’ share pledge is an additional determinant of a firm’s capital structure and cost of capital.
主讲人简介：林楚彬，6163银河.net163.am经管院助理教授，硕导。2016年取得台湾政治大学财务管理博士，随后至交大经管院任教。2013-2014年间，受邀前往美国乔治梅森大学商学院，担任访问学者。主要研究和教学领域为资产定价、行为金融与公司金融，研究成果陆续发表在JFQA、JBF以及JEF等国际金融顶尖权威期刊。
主办：6163银河.net163.am
承办：金融市场与公司金融科研团队
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